Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note by Walker, Christopher J.
Michigan Law Review First Impressions 
Volume 114 Article 6 
2015 
Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note 
Christopher J. Walker 
Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher J. Walker, Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 61 (2015). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol114/iss1/6 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions 




INSIDE REGULATORY INTERPRETATION:  
A RESEARCH NOTE 
Christopher J. Walker* 
We now live in a regulatory world, where the bulk of federal lawmaking 
takes place at the bureaucratic level. Gone are the days when statutes and 
common law predominated. Instead, federal agencies—through rulemaking, 
adjudication, and other regulatory action—have arguably become the 
primary lawmakers, with Congress delegating to its bureaucratic agents vast 
swaths of lawmaking power, the President attempting to exercise some 
control over this massive regulatory apparatus, and courts struggling to 
constrain agency lawmaking within statutory and constitutional bounds. 
This story is not new. Over two decades ago, for instance, Professor 
Lawson lamented the rise of the administrative state and traced it back to at 
least the New Deal.1 But law schools are just now starting to catch up by 
requiring courses in regulation and administrative law, often in the first 
year.2 Despite the publication of thousands of law review articles and judicial 
opinions on the interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, contracts, and 
other legal texts, to date little attention has been paid to the theory or 
practice of regulatory interpretation. Indeed, Professor Stack’s 2012 article 
Interpreting Regulations,3 the subject of this Research Note, is the seminal 
piece on the topic. 
In light of the importance of regulatory interpretation today, it is not 
surprising that the American Bar Association recognized Interpreting 
Regulations as the best work of administrative law scholarship published in 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State 
University. 
 1. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 
(1994). But see JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (tracing the history of the 
regulatory state from the Founding to the Gilded Age). 
 2. Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker & Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in 
Legislation, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 72–78 (2015) (detailing the rise of the first-year legislation-
and-regulation course). 
 3. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012). 
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2012.4 This recognition is well deserved. In Interpreting Regulations, Stack 
provides the first comprehensive approach to regulatory interpretation and 
situates this approach within the larger literature on legal interpretation. His 
theory of regulatory interpretation is simple yet pioneering: “a regulation 
should be read in light of its purposes, with the regulation’s text and the 
statement of basis and purpose constituting the privileged interpretive 
sources.”5 
To provide some context, unlike the drafters of statutes and most other 
legal texts, federal agencies are required by law to publish a statement of 
basis and purpose as part of the final agency rule.6 Although the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires only “a concise and general 
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose,”7 judicial doctrine has evolved to 
require agencies to provide a comprehensive account of the various purposes 
and justifications for the regulatory action.8 In other words, in practice these 
statements are neither concise nor general, but highly detailed and specific. 
They often respond to particular points raised during the public comment 
period and provide explanations for choosing one regulatory approach over 
another.9 
Moreover, perhaps motivated by constitutional separation-of-powers 
concerns, courts review regulations differently than other legal texts. Instead 
of “determin[ing] if there is any conceivable basis for upholding 
[regulations], as courts do in constitutional review of legislation,” Stack 
explains that courts must “ask whether the agency articulated grounds in its 
 
 4. Award of Scholarship in Administrative Law: Recipients, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/administrative_law/initiatives_awards/scholarshipawards
/past_scholarship_award_recipients.html [http://perma.cc/EW5H-JQAB]. Technically, 
Professor Stack shared this honor with Jerry Mashaw, for his terrific book Creating the 
Administrative Constitution. Id. Professor Jellum also features Interpreting Regulations in The 
Journal of Things We Like (Lots). Linda Jellum, A Textualist Approach to Purposivism in the 
Regulatory Arena, JOTWELL (Apr. 10, 2013), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/a-textualist-approach-
to-purposivism-in-the-regulatory-arena/ [http://perma.cc/SR6T-K2PJ]. 
 5. Stack, supra note 3, at 361–62. 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2014) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented 
[during the notice and comment period], the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a 
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Stack, supra note 3, at 378–79, 380–81 (discussing relevant judicial doctrines and 
their implications for agency rulemaking). 
 9. Id. at 392–93 (“[A]gencies today issue statements of basis and purpose that are far 
from mere preambles; they are extremely detailed rationales for, and explanations of, their 
regulations.”). 
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statement of basis and purpose on which the regulations may be upheld.”10 
Combining these administrative law principles, it naturally follows—at least 
in theory—that the statement of basis and purpose that is promulgated along 
with a final agency rule can and should play a critical role in interpreting that 
rule. 
This Research Note looks inside regulatory interpretation to explore the 
empirical foundation for Stack’s novel approach to regulatory interpretation. 
In 2013, the author of this Research Note conducted a 195-question survey 
of 128 federal agency rule drafters at seven executive departments 
(Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human 
Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation) and two 
independent agencies (the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Federal Reserve). Many of the results from that empirical study have been 
reported elsewhere.11 Four questions, however, were designed to assess 
Stack’s theory of regulatory interpretation from the perspective of the agency 
officials who draft these statements of basis and purpose.12 Part I presents 
the findings on those questions, which largely support Stack’s theory. Part II 
explains how the other findings from the study bear on regulatory 
interpretation. 
 
 10. Id. at 361 (citing Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundation of Chenery, 116 
YALE L.J. 952, 960–71 (2007)); see also Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and 
the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1561–65 (2014) 
(discussing the evolution of the Chenery doctrine and accompanying separation-of-powers 
concerns). 
 11. Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 
(2015) [hereinafter Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation]; see also Christopher J. 
Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
703 (2014) (exploring further the findings on the use of administrative law doctrines to shape 
agency interpretive behavior). The study is modeled on a similar study that Professors Gluck 
and Bressman conducted on congressional drafting. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013). The study methodology and its 
limitations are set forth in Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra, at 1013–16, 
and will not be repeated here. A copy of the survey is reproduced as an appendix to that prior 
work, id. at 1068–79, and this Research Note uses the abbreviation “Q_” to reference the 
question number being discussed, with the number of respondents to that question indicated 
as “(n=_).” Moreover, the survey allowed the respondents to make additional comments on 
most questions, and the dataset includes 345 such comments. This Research Note references 
such comments by question number and then the order in which the comments appear in the 
dataset. 
 12. Professor Stack graciously provided feedback on these questions, which was 
incorporated prior to survey administration. 
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I. AGENCY VIEWS ON STATEMENTS OF BASIS AND PURPOSE AS SOURCES FOR 
REGULATORY INTERPRETATION 
Especially in light of how intuitive Stack’s theory of regulatory 
interpretation appears, one might imagine that federal agencies draft these 
statements of basis and purpose with the express aim of guiding the courts, 
the public, and the regulated entities in interpreting final agency rules. And 
one might imagine that agencies expect courts to use those statements when 
interpreting regulations. To explore these assumptions, the agency rule 
drafters were asked four separate questions, the responses to which are 
depicted in Figure 1.13 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the rule drafters surveyed generally agreed that 
statements of basis and purpose are drafted with an eye toward judicial 
interpretation and that courts should rely on them as interpretive tools, but 
perhaps not as much as one would expect, at least as a descriptive matter. 
When asked if “[a]gencies should draft the statements of basis and purpose 
accompanying their rules in part to guide courts in interpreting those rules,” 
about two thirds agreed (40%) or strongly agreed (29%), and another 24% 
somewhat agreed. No one strongly disagreed, but 8% disagreed.14 If 
 
 13. These four questions asked the agency rule drafters to “[p]lease evaluate the 
following statements”: 
a. “Agencies should draft the statements of basis and purpose accompanying their rules 
in part to guide courts in interpreting those rules,” Q34(a) (n=91) (nk=6); 
 
b. “Agencies actually do draft the statements of basis and purpose accompanying their 
rules in part to guide courts in interpreting those rules,” Q34(b) (n=85) (nk=11); 
 
c. “Courts should use statements of basis and purpose when interpreting those rules,” 
Q34(c) (n=87) (nk=10); and 
 
d. “Courts actually do use statements of basis and purpose when interpreting those 
rules,” Q34(d) (n=68) (nk=29). 
The options were “strongly agree,” “agree,” “agree somewhat,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” 
“I don’t know,” and “other (explain).” A varying number of rule drafters indicated that they 
did not know for particular statements, as reported in the “no knowledge” (nk) number. 
Accordingly, the number of respondents considered and percentage calculations in Figure 1 do 
not include those responses. Nor, due to difficulty in coding, does the number of respondents 
include the 1-2 respondents who marked “other.” One of those respondents provided a reason 
for other: “ran out of time.” Q34 cmt. 1. This question was the second to last one in the survey. 
 14. Q34(a) (n=91) (nk=6). 
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converted to a composite score, the score would be 3.9 on a 5.0 scale (4.0 = 
agree).15 
FIGURE 1 
THE ROLE OF STATEMENTS OF BASIS AND PURPOSE 
IN REGULATORY INTERPRETATION 
When asked the same question descriptively (“actually do draft”) as 
opposed to normatively (“should draft”), the agency respondents were a bit 
less confident: About three in five rule drafters surveyed strongly agreed 
(22%) or agreed (39%), and another 27% somewhat agreed. Again, none 
strongly disagreed, but 12% disagreed—for a composite score of 3.7 (3.0 = 
somewhat agree; 4.0 = agree).16 Moreover, the number of respondents who 
indicated they did not know (and thus are not included in these percentages) 
nearly doubled from six to eleven. 
In other words, about nine in ten rule drafters surveyed at least 
somewhat agreed with Stack’s theory that agencies should draft (92%) and 
 
 15. Composite scores are calculated by giving five points for “strongly agree,” four 
points for “agree,” three points for “somewhat agree,” two points for “disagree,” and one point 
for “strongly disagree.” The aggregate is then divided by the total number of respondents for 
the question, excluding those who indicated they did not know and those who gave “other” 
responses. 
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actually do draft (88%) statements of basis and purpose in part to guide 
courts in interpreting those rules. But when disaggregated by strength of 
agreement, less than a third strongly agreed. A couple unsolicited comments 
may shed some additional light. For instance, one respondent observed that 
“[g]enerally, agencies should draft statements of basis and purpose for 
explaining to the public the rule.”17 And another remarked: “I think agencies 
routinely blow this opportunity.”18 
Turning to the second pair of questions about judicial use of statements 
of basis and purpose, the results are perhaps even more interesting. When 
asked if “[c]ourts should use statements of basis and purpose when 
interpreting those rules,” all but one respondent agreed to some degree: 31% 
strongly agreed, 47% agreed, and 21% somewhat agreed.19 This amounts to a 
composite score of 4.1 (4.0 = agree), the highest of the questions reported in 
Figure 1. One rule drafter’s comment in response to this question may reflect 
a broader consensus of the rule drafters surveyed: 
All our rules contain a “purpose” section, and I assume that is what you’re 
referring to. And naturally a court should consider them, as they’re part of 
the rule. If it was just a statement that appeared somewhere other than the 
CFR, however, I think the courts would use those less.20 
When asked the same question descriptively (“courts actually do use”) as 
opposed to normatively (“should use”), however, the agency respondents 
were far less confident: only about half strongly agreed (12%) or agreed 
(43%), with another 40% somewhat agreeing and 6% disagreeing (no one 
strongly).21 This results in a composite score of 3.6 (3.0 = somewhat agree; 
4.0 = agree). Moreover, the number of respondents who indicated that they 
did not know—and thus are not included in these percentages—nearly 
tripled from 10 to 29 respondents. In other words, a third of the rule drafters 
surveyed candidly admitted that they have no idea whether courts actually 
use these statements when interpreting agency regulations. 
 
 17. Q34 cmt. 3. 
 18. Q34 cmt. 2. 
 19. Q34(c) (n=87) (nk=10). 
 20. Q34 cmt. 4; cf. Stack, supra note 3, at 361 (“As a result of these doctrines, the text of 
a regulation and its statement of basis and purpose stand in a unique relationship: together, 
they constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not complete without either element of this 
couplet.”). 
 21. Q34(d) (n=68) (nk=29). 
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What should we make of these findings with respect to Stack’s theory on 
regulatory interpretation? It seems like the rule drafters surveyed agree that 
agencies should draft these statements with an eye toward helping courts 
interpret regulations and that courts should use such statements when 
interpreting the regulations. But they are less confident about whether courts 
actually do use statements of basis and purpose when interpreting 
regulations. This finding seems consistent with Stack’s own view (at least as 
of 2012) that “courts have not developed a consistent approach to regulatory 
interpretation under [administrative law deference] doctrines or 
elsewhere.”22 Indeed, this disconnect between agency intent and judicial 
practice reinforces Stack’s call for courts to develop a more comprehensive 
approach to regulatory interpretation that reflects the actual mechanics of 
agency rulemaking. 
Unfortunately, if citation to Interpreting Regulations is any indication of 
a change in judicial approach, no such change is evident—at least not yet. 
According to Westlaw KeyCite, Interpreting Regulations has been cited more 
than forty times since its publication in 2012, but never in a judicial opinion. 
Perhaps that is due to a lack of judicial exposure to this important article, as 
it has only been cited in two legal briefs. Hopefully this Research Note will 
help urge courts—and the government and private lawyers who litigate these 
issues23—to adopt a more comprehensive approach to interpreting 
regulations. The responses from the agency rule drafters surveyed provide 
pretty compelling support for Stack’s theory that courts should use 
statements of basis and purpose when interpreting regulations because 
agencies draft them with that purpose in mind and hope courts use them 
accordingly. 
II. PURPOSIVISM, TEXTUALISM, AND REGULATORY INTERPRETATION 
Stack goes to great lengths to ground his theory of regulatory 
interpretation in Hart and Sack’s Legal Process School and thus as a 
purposivist theory of interpretation.24 So much so that Professor Jellum, in 
reviewing the article, concluded that “[a]t bottom, Professor Stack’s article 
offers a new, but familiar, method for interpreting regulations; one that 
 
 22. Stack, supra note 3, at 359. 
 23. Cf. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative 
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 281–83 
(2013) (tracing the rise of judicial reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation in 
the 1930s and 1940s to the increased use and citation of legislative history in briefing by federal 
government attorneys). 
 24. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 3, at 383–91 (revisiting in depth HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994)). 
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purposivists will certainly embrace, but one that textualists will likely 
rebuff.”25 Jellum’s conclusion about textualism is debatable. But this 
textualism-purposivism classification may take on added significance if 
interpreters care about utilizing the same interpretive methodology as the 
drafters of the legal text under review. In particular, half of agency rule 
drafters who responded to the survey self-identified as textualist (35% 
moderate, 15% strong), whereas about a quarter identified as purposivist 
(19% moderate, 3% strong)—with the remainder stating they did not know 
or indicating “other.”26 
Although Stack is firm in labeling his theory purposivist in light of its 
grounding in Hart and Sacks, it is not at all clear that textualists should take 
issue with the theory (though they would obviously dispute the label). 
Indeed, Stack is not so definitive in the article itself, noting that “[a]t the level 
of specification given thus far, the theory fits under both mantles [of 
textualism and purposivism], and provides an example of their common 
ground.”27 More specifically, Stack first starts with the regulatory text both as 
a privileged source for discerning the regulation’s meaning and as a source of 
constraint on the interpretation.28 This is consistent with textualism. Second, 
because the statement of basis and purpose is required by law and an 
integrated part of the rule, Professor Stack argues that such statement too is a 
privileged source of discerning meaning and purpose—akin to the privileged 
nature of a formally enacted statement of purpose in legislation.29 
In subsequent writings, moreover, Stack has underscored the 
constraining nature of relying on such statement in regulatory 
interpretation: 
At a basic level, this purposive orientation treats an agency’s public and 
authoritative justifications for its regulations as more than an elaborate and 
costly nuisance necessary to survive judicial review—they also create 
 
 25. Jellum, supra note 4. 
 26. Q35 (n=98); see also Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 11, 
at 1016–18 (detailing background and experience of the survey respondents). As Stack notes 
elsewhere, the survey did not define these classifications, so we should be careful to not read 
too much into the respondents’ self-classification as textualist or purposivist. See Kevin M. 
Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. 
REV. 871, 898 n.113 (2015). Much more empirical investigation needs to be done. 
 27. Stack, supra note 3, at 406. 
 28. Id. at 392 (advocating interpretation “to the extent permitted by its text”); id. at 407 
(noting that when a text states purposes, “a textualist will attend to those purposes as part of 
her commitment to discerning the meaning of the text”). 
 29. Id. at 362–63. 
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commitments that continue to guide the regulations’ meaning, a goal that 
drafters of the APA envisioned for these statements. To be sure, this 
approach inhibits agency flexibility. It disallows agency constructions that 
are permitted by the regulation’s text but inconsistent with the agency’s 
original, public justifications. But one party’s flexibility is another’s 
unpredictability. Holding the agency to constructions of its regulations that 
are consistent with the agency’s own explanatory justifications translates 
directly into greater notice of the regulation’s meaning.30 
Accordingly, Stack makes a strong case that “both regulatory text and the 
regulation’s statement of basis and purpose count as part of the ‘text’ on 
which a textualist should center her interpretive inquiry.”31 
Framed this way, it seems that even Justice Scalia should agree with this 
approach to regulatory interpretation. After all, Justice Scalia has explained 
that “[p]erhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to 
follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to 
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and 
logical relation of its many parts.”32 Because the statement of basis and 
purpose is legally part of the regulation itself—as Stack convincingly 
argues—and its role in regulatory interpretation finds strong empirical 
support from the agency rule drafters surveyed in this author’s study, it 
seems reasonable to conclude as a matter of textualism that the regulatory 
language at issue must be read in view of the regulation’s statement of basis 
and purpose.33 
Indeed, in a recent article entitled Regulatory Textualism, Professor Nou 
proposes a textualist approach to regulatory interpretation.34 Just like Stack’s 
purposivist theory, Nou’s textualist approach instructs that “judges should 
first consider the preamble’s provision-by-provision analysis of the 
regulation, which frequently responds to public comments raising potential 
 
 30. Kevin M. Stack, How To Interpret a Regulation: First Principles, REGBLOG (Feb. 11, 
2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/02/11/11-stack-regulation-interpretation/ [http://perma 
.cc/MU3A-EK52]; accord Stack, supra note 3, at 407–10, 414–16. 
 31. Stack, supra note 3, at 407. 
 32. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012). 
 33. This does not mean that the current textualists on the Court have embraced Stack’s 
theory of regulatory interpretation. A number of Supreme Court decisions apply the plain text 
of the rule without resorting to the statement of basis and purpose, whereas others—including 
Talk America, Inc., v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261–62 (2011), and Coeur 
Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 287–91 (2009)—expressly 
rely on the statement. See Stack, supra note 3, at 372–74 (discussing cases). Moreover, one 
could imagine Justice Scalia dismissing the theory on formalist grounds by rejecting the 
argument that a statement of basis and purpose is part of the regulatory text but more akin to 
legislative history. Stack, however, seems to have the better argument on that point. 
 34. Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81 (2015). 
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ambiguities in the proposed regulation.”35 This is because the preamble—
which is another term for the statement of basis and purpose36—“is the best 
evidence of the regulatory text’s public meaning because it results from the 
agency’s back-and-forth with external commenters and political monitors.”37 
Drawing on insights from positive political theory, Nou then outlines the 
hierarchy of additional sources from which to derive the public meaning of 
regulatory text.38 An analysis of Nou’s overall theory of regulatory 
interpretation exceeds the scope of this Research Note, but her theory’s 
grounding in textualism—with the primary, privileged source of textual 
meaning being the statement of basis and purpose—underscores that any 
purported textualism-purposivism dichotomy in Stack’s theory is arguably a 
false one.39 
That textualists and purposivists should both embrace Stack’s theory of 
regulatory interpretation does not mean we have arrived at one coherent 
theory of everything in regulatory interpretation—a theory that has eluded 
us in the context of statutory interpretation and elsewhere. As Stack notes, 
the interpretive camps will still part ways when “the text of the regulation 
and the statement of basis and purpose have been well mined by the court 
and neither sheds light on the interpretive question posed.”40 At that point, 
the interpreter must resort to other interpretive tools. The textualist and the 
purposivist may well disagree on which tools should be prioritized to resolve 
any remaining ambiguity. The textualist may well place more weight on 
semantic canons, with the purposivist focusing more on the purposes and 
policies that seem to drive the regulation (and statute underlying the 
regulation). 
 
 35. Id. at 85. 
 36. See id. at 85 n.12 (“To maintain consistency with other scholars’ terminology, this 
Article will also define ‘preamble’ as the agency’s statement of basis and purpose.”). 
 37. Id. at 85. 
 38. Id. at 116–27. 
 39. To be sure, Nou’s approach takes issue with some of the more purposivist leanings 
in Stack’s approach. For instance, “regulatory textualism rejects reliance on the broad 
statements of purpose often found in preambles in favor of more specific explanatory 
provisions,” as these broader statements “often admit of multiple purposes or simply mirror 
the language of the statute in ways that do not shed any independent interpretive light.” Id. at 
120. This disagreement, however, does not seem to go to the heart of whether the interpretive 
theory is textualist or purposivist, but how textualists and purposivists would differ in 
interpreting the text of an agency’s statement of basis and purpose—similar to debates that 
take place when interpreting legislatively enacted statements of purpose. 
 40. Stack, supra note 3, at 407. 
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If the interpreter were concerned with what the agency rule drafters 
actually used in drafting the regulation, it would be wise to not follow the 
canons indiscriminately and instead look inside regulatory interpretation. As 
explored in much greater detail elsewhere, the agency rule drafters surveyed 
for this study did not embrace all of the canons equally.41 For instance, they 
reported general awareness and use of the ordinary meaning canon, the 
whole act rule, consistent usage canon, noscitur a sociis (associated words 
canon), and ejusdem generis (residual clause canon).42 Legislative history was 
also among the interpretive tools most reported by the agency respondents 
as used when drafting rules.43 But they reported less usage and reliance on 
expressio unius (negative implication canon), the presumption against 
superfluities (surplusage canon), and most of the substantive canons—just to 
mention a few.44 
In other words, even if courts, litigants, and scholars fully embraced 
Stack’s theory, we would still be left with many questions and debates about 
how to interpret regulations. But those debates are not new ones, as they 
have been commonplace in legal interpretation dating back to at least 
Professor Llewellyn’s famous cannoning of the canons.45 To the extent, 
however, we care about whether interpretive tools are grounded in the 
empirical realities of agency rulemaking, much more investigation inside 
regulatory interpretation needs to be done. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the important theoretical work Professor Stack has done in 
Interpreting Regulations, it seems courts (and litigants) have yet to embrace 
an approach to regulatory interpretation that treats statements of basis and 
purpose as a “privileged source of interpretation.”46 The views of federal 
agency rule drafters presented herein provide compelling support for such 
an approach to regulatory interpretation and should further encourage 
courts to move in that direction. Stack’s theory deserves more scholarly 
attention and judicial adoption from purposivists and textualists alike. We 
can then turn to perhaps more difficult questions about which other 
interpretive tools should be kept or discarded in the regulatory 
 
 41. See Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 11, at 1020 fig.2 
(comparing the agency rule drafters’ reported use of over twenty interpretive tools). 
 42. For more on the findings related to the sematic canons, see id. at 1022–31. 
 43. For more on the findings related to legislative history, see id. at 1034–48. 
 44. For more on the findings related to the substantive canons, see id. at 1031–34. 
 45. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (“[T]here 
are two opposing canons on almost every point.”). 
 46. Stack, supra note 3, at 420. 
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interpretation toolkit in light of how federal agencies actually draft rules in 
the modern administrative state. 
